Aggravation of risk and failure to take precautionary measures are focal issues in nonlife insurance in terms of potential partial or full release of the insurer from the duty to perform. Not infrequently, it is difficult to draw a line between the aggravation of risk on the one hand, and non-compliance with precautionary measures on the other, since a particular action by a policyholder may present both situations. At the same time, the legal remedies available to the insurer regarding these two situations are different in scope. The aggravation of risk and non-compliance with precautionary measures are precisely the bases on which insurers actually reduce indemnity or refuse to compensate for damages. This article explores the differences between insurance laws in the Baltic states-specifically, the
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the European Union (EU), insurance law differs to quite a substantial degree. The EU is becoming more and more integrated, and freedom of movement has led to the modern reality that people can travel and work abroad, have good reason to be surprised that they cannot maintain their previous contracts. This is because of differences in jurisdictions. However, when looking at this from the perspective of freedom of movement in EU and consumers' legitimate expectations as policyholders, this outcome does not offer the protection it perhaps should-consumers ought to be able to expect that, having procured insurance coverage, the insurance would have similar practical meaning even if the consumer travels, works or lives in different jurisdictions.
In a 2010 Green Paper, 1 the European Commission recommended seven approaches 2 to enhance the uniformity of contract law, including allowing consumers and companies alike to choose an optional instrument of European contract law, or second regime, for their contractual relations. On June 8, 2011, as part of its progress toward a European Contract Law for consumers and businesses,
Independent of their precise labeling, the policyholder's precautionary obligations 11 must be distinguished from clauses describing, delimiting or excluding the insured risk. These clauses determine the insurer's obligations without reference to the policyholder's conduct and provide which risks are covered by the policy and which not. The distinction between these clauses and precautionary obligations is usually problematic, since every precautionary obligation can also be formulated as a description, limitation or exclusion of risk. 12 Currently, regulations concerning a policyholder's duty regarding aggravation of risk and precautionary measures vary significantly across EU member states, and 9 On 17 January 2013, the European Commission set up an Expert Group on European Insurance Contract law in order to assist the European Commission in examining whether and to what extent the differences in contract laws pose an obstacle to cross-border trade in insurance products (Commission
Decision of 17 January 2013 on Setting up the Commission Expert Group on a European Insurance
Contract Law, Official Journal of the European Union, C 16/6 (January 19, 2013)). 10 Giesela Rühl, "Precautionary Obligations (Insurance Contracts)": 3; in: Jürgen Basedow, Klaus Hopt, and Reinhard Zimmermann, eds., Encyclopaedia of European Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) // http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1989538. 11 Precautionary measures and precautionary obligations are synonyms. 12 See also research by Russian insurance-law scholar V. M. Akhinian, "Novyi vzgliad na dogovornye iskliucheniia v strakhovom prave," Pravovedenie 2 (5) (2009) 
[in Russian]
Chapter 48) governing Russian insurance law 27 in relation to aggravation of risk 28 and precautionary measures 29 and not to engage in a thorough review of relevant Russian judicial practice. 30 This having been said, we will include reference to 23 For example, Art. 427, Estonian LOA, contains a long list of provisions from which the parties cannot deviate to the disadvantage of the policyholder, including different grounds for terminating the insurance contract in the LOA and the PEICL. 24 "The PEICL [needs] rules of general contract law to supplement them, such as rules on offer and acceptance, on the computation of time periods, on the compliance with certain formal requirements, and on prescription. In this context, a body of general contract law is urgently needed. Could such a body of general contract law be adopted in the form of [a] nonbinding instrument such as the CFR? It would be sufficient if the specific instruments incorporate the general rules by an appropriate reference as it has been suggested in the PEICL. The incorporation provision of [the] PEICL confers the character of an opt-in instrument to the incorporated rules of general contract law, be it the PECL or CFR" (Jürgen Basedow, "Transjurisdictional Codification," Tulane Law Review 83 (4) (2009): 973). 25 See also the work by Russian insurance-law scholar A. Karapetov, "Pravo na otkaz ot vyplaty strakhovogo vozmeshcheniia s tochki zreniia printsipa svobody dogovora," selected Russian court judgments that were analyzed in an early 2013 review (obzor) of judicial practice prepared by the RF Supreme Court's Presidium 31 in this field and, furthermore, occasionally will refer to some of the more recent works of Russian insurance theorists to offer the reader of this work an additional, albeit highly selective, comparative frame of reference since the principles of insurance remain the same regardless of differences between the legal systems. A truly comprehensive comparison of developments relating to aggravation of risk and precautionary measures in Russian 'law in books' and 'law in action' will have to be the subject of future research.
AGGRAVATION OF RISK

INSURED RISK AS THE OBJECT OF AN INSURANCE CONTRACT
The element of risk, which is inseparable from human activity, is the possibility that a certain action or activity will lead to a loss. Valeria Gavrilova 32 explains that people use four different risk-management techniques in everyday life as protection against risks: (1) risk avoidance; (2) loss avoidance; (3); risk acceptance; and (4) risk transfer. For the purposes of insurance contracts, we are only interested in the fourth technique, risk transfer. One means of risk transfer is to conclude an insurance contract, which transfers the policyholder's risk to an insurance company. An insured risk, as the term clearly suggests, is that risk against which insurance coverage is procured. 33 For instance, in insuring a house, insured risks may include fire, acts of God, floods, vandalism, theft, etc. When a car is covered with motor hull (CASCO) insurance, insured risks can include the risk of a traffic accident, fire, theft, etc. Insurance is a risk treatment option involving risk sharing. In non-life insurance, an insured event means the realization of an insured 31 Obzor po otdel ' 33 The definition of 'insured risk' raises a question about the insurer's performance. According to the theory of risk bearing (Gefahrtragungstheorie), the performance of the insurer means that the insurer assumes-upon entering into an insurance contract-the risk that an insured event will occur. The payment of an indemnity after an insured event merely flows from realization of the insured risk. According to the cash-benefit theory (Geldleistungstheorie), the insurer's performance obligation emerges only after the occurrence of an insured event (see Most domestic systems in the European Union have gone through an evolution where, initially, the main concern was to protect the insurer against various types of fraudulent behavior by the insured. Of course, this concern is still there.
But now the stress is on providing the insured with protection against various types of abusive clauses which, in the past, were frequently imposed by [the] insurer, and submitting the insurer to several new types of obligations. 39 The authors of this article conclude that contemporary insurance law should not prioritize protecting insurers against potential insurance fraud above protecting policyholders against various types of abusive clauses. Although the insured risk seems to be clear and constant in legal terms, the applicable regulations vary within the Baltic states. Thus, consumers traveling frequently among these three small countries may have significant difficulties understanding their obligations when concluding insurance contracts in different jurisdictions. The question of insurance risk exclusions and limitations also arises in relation to the topic of precautionary measures (addressed in Section 3).
WHICH AGGRAVATION OF RISK MUST BE COMMUNICATED TO AN INSURER?
Upon entering into an insurance contract, 40 the insurer assumes that the insured risk will remain unchanged during the insurance period-by assessing the 38 Consequently, we may conclude that policyholders are protected on the basis of a modern pro-policyholder approach to insurance law in Lithuania in line with the PEICL. We cannot say the same for Latvia and Estonia. Therefore, implementation of the PEICL would be beneficial for Latvian and Estonian policyholders with respect to the issue of aggravation of risk.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE AGGRAVATION OF RISK IF THERE IS NO INSURED EVENT
When a risk is aggravated, the insurer questions whether the insurance contract would have been concluded at all in the beginning, because the risk might have been unsuitable for the insurer or it might have been suitable only if the premiums were higher. We return to Malcolm Clarke, as he notes: entitles the insurer to terminate the contract in the event of aggravation of the insured risk, such right shall be exercised by written notice to the policyholder within one month of the time when the aggravation becomes known or apparent to the insurer. Upon termination of the contract, however, the policyholder must be afforded the opportunity and sufficient time to find an alternative insurance offer and thus ensure consistency of insurance coverage. It is for this reason that the PEICL requires that the insurer exercise its right to cancel the contract within one month after learning about the aggravation of risk at the latest. It should be noted
here that an insurance contract will be terminated one month after receipt of the related notice, but only subject to the condition that the policyholder did not intentionally breach the obligation to provide notification. If the policyholder's obligations are violated intentionally, the insurance contract will be terminated at the moment it is canceled by the insurer. Herman Cousy explains the notification procedure:
58 Malcolm Clarke notes that the notion of fault as a determining factor has a certain attraction from a moral point of view. With one reservation, in view of widespread ignorance about materiality on the part of consumers (and hence when they should notify their insurer), there must be doubt whether 'fault' is a useful element here. The likelihood is that it would be a source of fruitless disputes or, worse, an allegation which claims´ handlers could use to fend off claims which they felt, on the basis of instinct rather than evidence, were without merit. If fault is to be a factor at all, it should be one that is easy to prove or disprove. The reservation concerns serious fault such as fraud and willful misconduct. Most countries have a rule of some kind that blocks recovery by a policyholder in respect of loss caused by 'willful misconduct', i.e., intentionally or recklessly (see ibid.).
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One possibility is that a contract provides that in case of aggravation of risk, the insurer shall be allowed to terminate the contract. The Principles recognize that an insurer may have good reasons to do so, but the Principles submit the insurer's right to do so to a number of restrictions. A written notice is required to be given to the policyholder within one month of the moment when aggravation was known or apparent to the insurer. Cover is to expire one month after termination, and only immediately if the policy-holder was in intentional breach of his duty. If an insured event occurs before cover has expired, then insurance money is to be payable. However, if the insured event is caused by the aggravated risk, and if the aggravation is one of which the policy-holder was aware/or should have been aware prior to the event, then the proportionality rule must apply. This means that there can only be a proportional reduction of the insurance payment if the insurer would have insured at a higher price. Only in the hypothesis of an uninsurable risk, can there be an entire loss of cover.
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As demonstrated, the legal consequences stemming from aggravation of risk where there has been no insured event are different in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
We conclude that the regulation of the PEICL, which, on the one hand leaves it to the insurer's discretion to decide whether they wish to cancel or modify an insurance contract, and on the other makes it possible (except in case of intent) for the policyholder to attain a new insurer in a reasonable time frame, is more consumer-friendly than the relevant insurance laws of the Baltic states.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE AGGRAVATION OF RISK IN THE CASE OF AN INSURED EVENT
In practice, it is not extraordinary that the probability of an insured risk would change after the signing of an insurance contract. Under such circumstances, the insurance premium calculated by the insurer on the basis of disclosed information upon the signing of the contract would no longer be proportionate to the risk (adverse selection) that the insurer now has to bear. The law generally prohibits an increase of the probability of an insured risk by the policyholder or by third parties for which the policyholder is responsible. In the PEICL, the consequences of breaching the duty of notification are set out in introduces an entirely new principle through which the ability of an insurer to discharge his liability is limited. This is achieved by reducing the insurance money in proportion to the degree of fault apportioned to the policyholder. However, the right of an insurer to reduce the insurance money payable is limited to cases in which the policyholder has acted with gross negligence. In cases of ordinary negligence, the entire amount of the insurance money will be payable. In contrast, the insurer will be fully discharged in cases of intentional or fraudulent behavior by the policyholder" (Helmut Heiss, supra note 6: 106). The VVG also provides for similar consequences for the policyholder where the duty of notifying the insurer about the aggravation of risk is violated. Pursuant to Art.26(2) of the VVG, the insurer is released from the obligation to perform the insurance contract if the policyholder intentionally fails to give notice of the aggravation of risk. However, if the policyholder is careless and fails to exercise necessary care and the policyholder's behavior can be qualified as gross negligence, the abovementioned provision releases the insurer from the performance obligation only partially. But the onus probandi to show there was no gross negligence is on the policyholder, i.e., it is assumed that the policyholder was grossly negligent. 67 The Estonian Supreme Court noted in its judgment No.3-2-1-17-08 of 9 April 2008 that: "The courts incorrectly failed to notice and implement Article 445 (2) of the LOA under which, if a policyholder violates the requirement provided for in Article 444 of the LOA, the insurer shall be released from the obligation to perform the insurance contract to the extent of the increase in the probability of the insured risk due to the circumstances caused by the policyholder, if the insured event occurs after an increase in the insured risk. Based on Article 445 (2) of the LOA, Article 452 (2) 2) of the LOA does not grant the insurer the right to not pay the insurance indemnity in full if the policyholder violates an obligation with respect to the insurer to reduce the insured risk or prevent an increase of the insured risk and the violation had no bearing on the occurrence of the insured event or the insurer's performance obligation. Pursuant to the first sentence of Article 452 (1) of the LOA, an insurer shall be released from the performance obligation if the policyholder, the insured person or the beneficiary intentionally caused the occurrence of the insured event. As under Article 427 (1) of the LOA, any agreement in derogation of Article 452 (2) of the LOA to the detriment of the policyholder is void, Clause 23 of the general terms and conditions and Clause 15.8 of the general terms and conditions of casco are void to the extent they allow the defendant to not pay the indemnity in full if the policyholder has violated the obligation not to increase the probability of the insured risk. In reviewing the case, the circuit court must assess whether the plaintiff increased, by his violation of his obligations, the probability of the insured risk ( 
PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES
WHAT ARE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES (WARRANTIES)?
It is characteristic of precautionary measures that they include guidance on how to avoid damages or reduce damages that occur. 74 . 82 It has been argued that precautionary obligations are not assessed for their fairness. In England, in particular, it is widely held that warranties are not subject to review under Art.3 of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive because they determine when the insurer is required to pay in case an insured event occurs (see Giesela Rühl, supra note 10: 5). 83 Ibid. 84 The authors find that this question is a common subject in court disputes. Exemption from risk means that a situation is not covered by insurance, and the insurer does not have any obligation to perform. In case of an exemption from risk, the insurer does not have the obligation to perform regardless of the causality between the exemption from risk and the circumstances that led to the occurrence of damages. A precaution may be phrased as a warranty (where, for example, the insured warrants that a vehicle will 'be kept in a roadworthy condition'). It may also be phrased as an exception belonging to the terms descriptive of the risk (the accident will not be covered 'while the vehicle is not in a roadworthy condition').
[...] The distinction may have a substantial impact in practice, in particular in those countries where differences in requirements to be fulfilled to deny coverage successfully with an appeal to these clauses, are accepted. situation where a vehicle is stolen using keys that were taken from the driver's pocket while his jacket was in his office. The court found that a general contractual term that, as a result of its content, presentation or phrasing, is so unusual or incomprehensible that it could not be reasonably understood by the other contractual party or expected to be included in the contract would not be regarded as part of the contract. Because theft was included as part of the insurance risk, the Court decided that this situation could not be considered an exemption from risk. . 89 The court found that: "insured risk is a risk against which insurance is procured. The vehicle was insured against the risk of theft. The court believes that such a provision is contrary to Article 452 (2) 2) of the LOA as the presence of break-in traces does not affect the occurrence of an insured event for the purposes of this clause. The occurrence of an insured event may be affected by other factors, in particular the behaviour of the policyholder before the occurrence of the insured event. A general term whose content, form of expression or mode of presentation is so unusual or unintelligible that the other party to the contract could not have expected the presence of such a term in the contract based on the principle of reasonableness or understand the term without substantial effort, shall not be deemed to be a part of the contract. 
INSURER'S RIGHT TO TERMINATE A CONTRACT UPON BREACH OF PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES OBLIGATIONS
Article 4:102(1) of the PEICL states that if a clause provides that an insurer is entitled to terminate a contract in the event of non-compliance with a precautionary measure, that clause will be without effect unless the policyholder (or the insured)
has breached his/her obligation with intent to cause a loss or recklessly with knowledge that a loss would probably result. 92 The wording of the PEICL provision shows that those sanctions apply only if the implementation of sanctions is defined in a clause of a contract. Hence, without incorporating a relevant provision in the general terms and conditions, the insurer cannot unilaterally terminate a contract.
Thus, the PEICL restricts the insurer's right to terminate a contract in case of noncompliance with precautionary measures, making this right dependent on the intentional behavior of the policyholder to cause a loss or recklessness with knowledge that a loss would probably result. This is justified because an insurer
should not be entitled to rid itself of a contract in a situation where precautionary measures were not complied with due to negligence or gross negligence. It is precisely due to negligence that insurance contracts are often entered into-for instance, the usual causa causans when a car drives off the road is that the speed was inappropriate for the road conditions or the weather, i.e. the policyholder was negligent. If an insurer had the right to terminate the contract due to noncompliance with precautionary measures because of negligence, the formation of insurance contracts might often lead to ab absurdo, because one of the reasons why policyholders conclude insurance contracts is to protect themselves against their own ordinary negligence. In a situation where the insurer's performance obligation is precluded due to negligence, the degree of fault and its consequences do not correspond in terms of the proportionality the parties would have achieved if they had negotiated the contract. This represents a case of ignoring the principle of transparency and thus the court should, on the basis of the contra proferentem rule, not agree to release the insurer from its performance obligation, because in essence it is not possible to exclude negligence in standard terms and conditions.
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Article 4:102(2) of the PEICL provides that the right to terminate a contract shall be exercised by written notice to the policyholder within one month of the time when noncompliance with a precautionary measure becomes known or 92 Ibid. Schauer stresses that an insurer is entitled to terminate a contract if the policyholder or the insured has acted with intent to cause a loss or has acted recklessly with knowledge that a loss would probably result. 93 However, it is possible to exclude negligence in standard terms and conditions through separate contractual negotiations. If negligence is excluded in standard terms and conditions, then this would violate Directive 93/13/EEC, because it would be unexpected and surprising for the ordinary policyholder. Accordingly, in the case of non-compliance with precautionary measures, the PEICL does not afford the policyholder a period of grace to attain a new insurer. The receipt of the notice of termination is relevant for determining the time limit.
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Let us undertake a comparison of legal consequences, using actual general terms and conditions from Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian insurers and apply them to a hypothetical example. In the example, an insured house is empty for one week before the winter period because the policyholder and his/her family are traveling abroad on a holiday. During this time, the house is unheated, and the outdoor temperature drops below zero degrees Celsius. As a result, the water pipes freeze and burst, causing substantial damages. Let us further abstract this example with two alternatives: (i) while the family was holidaying, the heating system stopped working due to a technical problem, i.e. the policyholder was unaware of the circumstances and had no control over them; or (ii) in order to curb costs, the policyholder switched off the heating system for the duration of the holiday. In case of the latter scenario, we can distinguish between two cases: a) when departing for their holiday, it could not have been foreseen that the outdoor temperature would drop below zero; and b) when departing for their holiday, the outdoor temperature already was below zero.
In seeking an answer to the question of whether or not the insurer has the right to terminate the contract in this case, one must take the stance that this may turn out to be an unambiguous situation. With the PEICL, the termination of the contract first requires the sanction to apply only if it is defined in a clause of the contract, and, second, that the policyholder or the insured breached its obligation with intent to cause the loss or did so recklessly with knowledge that the loss would 100 According to Article 470(1) of the Estonian LOA, if a policyholder materially violates an obligation prescribed by a contract due to circumstances under the policyholder's control, the insurer may cancel the contract without prior notice within one month of becoming aware of the violation. If the insurer does not exercise this right, the insurer cannot rely on such circumstances, should an insured event occur, to refuse to indemnify fully or to provide payment. Hence, if the policyholder does not comply with the relevant precautionary measures, Estonian insurers may invoke the general norm that a contract may be terminated if contractual obligations are violated. If that right is not exercised, however, it becomes a ratihabitio situation. Taking into account the ratio for inserting a warranty into the policy, like the presence of a sprinkler device in full operation as a condition precedent of coverage, it is reasonable to assume that in case of a policy of fire insurance, the requirement of causation will also be met if the noncompliance did not start 102 The basic philosophy for the majority of the PEICL Group (the international group of scholars working on the PEICL model regulation) was that, without any requirement of fault, the rule felt unjust and incomplete. Freeing the insurer from covering a loss can generally not be legitimized if the fault on the insured's part is only 'slight' negligence (see Stella Sakellaridou 116 Mop van Tiggele-van der Velde, professor of insurance law at the Erasmus School of Law in Rotterdam, states: "The development that characterises insurance law in the past decades is most clearly reflected in the legislation itself: new insurance law legislation has strengthened the position of the insured-as a consumer-considerably. In order to achieve this higher level of protection, the number of mandatory provisions has been considerably extended, particularly where consumer insurance is concerned. The context behind this development is clear: the insurance contract must offer protection, and in order to guarantee that protection, safeguards are incorporated by the legislator, already mentioned, as well as in case law. The insurer is more and more obliged to adopt a proactive approach to protect the interests of the insured Concerning the PEICL, Rühl argues that:
In particular, many countries-notably Germany and Austria-have replaced the long-standing all-or-nothing principle which entailed the unraveling of the insurance policy on the occasion of a breach with a graded system of legal consequences which take account of the policyholder's fault as well as the causal relationship between the breach and the insurance claim. 119 Today, pursuant to the relevant provisions as well as pursuant to Article 4:102 of the PEICL, the insurer is regularly discharged from liability if the policyholder acted deliberately and if the breach has caused either damage or the occurrence of the insured event or has increased the level of damage. Grossly negligent behavior normally allows the insurer to reduce the insurance sum to be paid, whereas negligent behavior has no effect on his duty to pay. According to most recently reformed legal schemes and Article 4:102 of the PEICL, the insurer may only terminate the contract in cases of intentional breach or gross negligence. Mere negligence will not absolve insurers from their responsibility. 120
In essence, the Latvian ICL allows for the precluding of the insurer's performance obligation in the case of gross negligence, and even ordinary negligence may be used to restrict the insurer's performance. Pursuant to Article 24(3) of the Latvian ICL, the insurer's duty is to indemnify if an insured event occurs because the insured, the policyholder, the beneficiary or a third person committed ordinary negligence and indemnity does not contradict the insurance contract.
However, under Article 89 of the Lithuanian IL, an insurance contract may specify cases where an insurer is released from the obligation to pay the insurance benefit if the insured event occurs due to gross negligence on the part of the policyholder or of the insured person. Nevertheless, the Lithuanian IL assumes that such cases must be negotiated individually.
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winter season, when use was prohibited. Because the law governing the use of recreational craft in Russia releases the insurer from liability to pay damages in cases of gross negligence, the court dismissed the policyholder's claim (see Obzor po otdel'nym voprosam sudebnoi praktiki, supra note 31: 9-10). 119 The January 2013 review by the Presidium of the Russian Supreme Court provides an example where the court granted a policyholder's action against their insurer, who had declined to provide compensation for damages on the basis of intent. The insurer's stance was that, since the policyholder did not close the hood of the car completely (it was not fixed in place), damages were caused by intent. The court, however, ruled that the policyholder had not acted with intent (ibid., 9). 120 Giesela Rühl, supra note 10: 6. 121 For example, in a decision dealing with Art.89 of the IL, the Lithuanian Supreme Court held that the parties had to individually consider any term of an insurance contract under which the insurer is released from its obligation to pay insurance benefits due gross negligence on the part of the policyholder or the insured. In this case, the parties had entered into three insurance contracts covering the airplane, the pilot and the pilot's civil liability. The insured plane subsequently crashed, killing some of the passengers on board. The claimant filed an insurance claim, which was refused. The lower courts dismissed the claim. But the Supreme Court held that the parties had to individually consider any term of an insurance contract under which the insurer is released from its obligation to pay insurance benefits due to the policyholder's or insured person's gross negligence. Thus, it could not be a standard clause of the ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 8, NUMBER 2 2015
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The question of fault is often subjective. However, it is questionable whether under similar circumstances different solutions in different jurisdictions might be acceptable, particularly given the principle of free movement of persons in the EU and policyholders' expectations regarding the protection provided by the insurance contract.
The question of culpability should also be considered on a more general level-looking back to our initial question of how the law throughout the EU differs and leads to different results. Is it reasonable to expect that a person from Portugal, working in Denmark, should take different levels of precautionary measures (for example, fire safety measures) than they would at home in a similar situation?
Answering 'yes' to this question means admitting that the nature of insurance is subject to great changes within the area of the EU. For instance, it is a customary precautionary measure of motor hull insurance that the keys of the vehicle be kept in such a way that does not facilitate their theft, and the doors of the vehicle must be locked after leaving the car. while retrieving medicine from the trunk of the car. In this case, it was decided that the damages were to be fully compensated by the insurance company. In another case, where the policyholder started the engine in a parking lot to warm the vehicle up, then went back home for 15 minutes and upon returning discovered that the car had been stolen, the verdict was that the policyholder was grossly negligent and that the insurer could reduce the indemnity by up to 50 percent. 125 According to Art.9:101(1) of the PEICL: "Neither the policyholder nor the insured, as the case may be, shall be entitled to indemnity to the extent that the loss was caused by an act or omission on his part with intent to cause the loss, or recklessly and with knowledge that the loss would probably result.
(2) Subject to a clear clause in the policy providing for reduction of the insurance money according to the degree of fault on his part, the policyholder or insured, as the case may be, shall be entitled to indemnity in respect of any loss caused by an act or omission on his part that was negligent." 126 Martin Schauer argues that: "One may ask about the relationship between precautionary measures and the causation of loss by an intentional or reckless act of a policyholder or insured, as defined in Art. 9:101. If the insured does not take necessary precautionary measures, can Art. 9:101 be applied as well? Both problems are well known in national law. Dozens of theories have been developed in legal scholarship, especially in Germany. These problems will have to be discussed with regard to the PEICL as well, and European solutions will have to be found" (Martin Schauer, supra note 76: 164). 127 For example, Art.6.1014 of the CC provides that the insurer shall indemnify the policyholder if malicious acts or infringements are deemed socially valuable (self-defence, performance of a civil duty, etc. and classifying such acts as a separate precautionary measure, the insurer is also thereby defining its potential legal remedies in case of non-compliance. However, this gives rise to the risk that, when applying the PEICL in the future, insurers will not always adequately define the quantum of precautionary measures in their general terms and conditions in order to be entitled to invoke Article 9:101, and such behavior could be seen as acting in bad faith on the part of the insurer.
Another way is to analyze the goal of a precautionary measure through its causal relationship. 130 So, the Finnish legal scholar Jaana Norio-Timonen findsthat causes of damage may be divided into: sufficient causes and essential causes. A sufficient cause includes circumstances that make a certain thing possible in terms of the laws of nature and society as a whole. An essential cause includes circumstances without which a certain consequence would not have occurred. The behavior described by a precautionary measure is a sufficient cause for the occurrence of an insured event but it is not an essential cause. Therefore, non-compliance with the precautionary measure and occurrence of an insured event do not solve the question of causality; rather, the specific goal of the precautionary measure should be weighed in each case. 131 An essential cause or efficient proximate cause is one that sets others in motion, but it is not necessarily the last act in a chain of events.
While the efficient proximate cause is said to set in motion a chain of events, it is not necessarily the triggering cause; rather, it is the predominating cause. The triggering cause may be a sufficient cause or immediate cause that is the final act leading to a particular result or event, directly producing such result without any further intervention. the different regulations if they wish to procure insurance coverage that would be understandable to laypeople and would pay out the indemnity in similar cases throughout EU.
We argue that the implementation of the PEICL will eventually result, first, in lower prices for policyholders and, second, in the emergence of large insurance corporations that operate in several EU countries, using optional instruments to unify their products.
Since the relevant regulations provided in the PEICL are more favorable and consumer-friendly for policyholders in the Baltic states, it would be in the interests of Baltic policyholders that the PEICL be promptly enforced as a so-called secondregime instrument in the European Union. Should the PEICL be enforced, life of consumers would undoubtedly be much easier, as consumers would be able to choose among unified insurance products. Likewise, implementation of the PEICL should result in more harmonized case law, which could help the consumers better assess the risks of operation.
At the beginning of this article we asked whether a policyholder's fault would increase as s/he travels 80 kilometers south from Helsinki, Finland, to Tallinn, Estonia. We could ask the same if s/he were to travel 840 kilometers from Milan, Italy, to Berlin, Germany. The only likely answer is 'no'; thus, in order to prevent the exceptions and differences described in this article, which hinder people from real-life problem-free use of the freedom of movement -living and working in neighboring countries -and to make the dream of a borderless EU come true, the enforcement of the PEICL as a second-regime legal act is desirable for all citizens of the EU. 
